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Religious Liberty and French Secularism∗ 
Jacques Robert∗∗ 
I. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
The democratic state that endeavors to respect the opinions of all 
its constituents must extend its protection to all religious groups if 
religious freedom is to be considered more than a particular, 
subordinate aspect of the freedom to form one’s own opinion. These 
two freedoms seem to merge into one, but, at the same time, 
religious freedom both falls within and extends beyond the bounds 
of the freedom of opinion. 
Religious liberty is first and foremost an individual liberty 
because it represents an individual’s ability to give, or not to give, 
intellectual attachment to a religion—to choose the religion freely or 
to refuse it. But it is also a collective liberty in that, not exhausting 
itself in faith or belief, it necessarily gives birth to a practice whose 
free exercise must be guaranteed. Free exercise of religion must be 
assured in order to guarantee complete religious liberty. This 
proposition presupposes that every religious movement must be the 
master of its own activities, possessing the right to organize itself 
freely. This free organization inevitably poses the delicate problem of 
relations between religions—or churches—and the state. 
II. CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 
It is necessary to point out that the relations between churches 
and the state are not necessarily indicative of the general level of 
religious freedom in France. It is enough to say that such relations 
 
∗ This article is a slightly modified excerpt from JACQUES ROBERT, ENJEUX DU SIÈCLE: 
NOS LIBERTÉS [STAKES OF THE CENTURY: OUR LIBERTIES] 120–43 (2002). Professor Robert 
presented this material at the Ninth Annual International Law and Religion Symposium held at 
Brigham Young University on October 6–9, 2002. This article was translated from French to 
English by the Brigham Young University Law Review. 
∗∗ Professor Jacques Robert is the Honorary President of l’Université Panthéon-Assas, 
and a former member of the French Conseil Constitutionnel. 
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can be on equal footing with religious liberty—at least as much as 
any other specific relations. 
France, for its part, has experimented throughout its history with 
nearly all of the existing formulas for church-state relations. If France 
has finally opted for what is termed a secular stance, it is because 
France found, at the beginning of the twentieth century, that the 
secular stance conforms more than any other to France’s inclinations 
and ideals. This secular approach is not the only one to be practiced 
among democratic states; indeed, the secular approach is rare. Other 
approaches are perfectly conceivable and have been adopted by many 
states. 
Even in a democratic state, it is possible that a sort of fusion 
exists between the “temporal” and the “spiritual,” or at the very least 
a union between them that can manifest itself in various forms: a 
state religion, recognized churches, and incorporation of the church 
into the state. 
Even if Europe alone is considered, one notices an extraordinary 
complexity in relationships between church and state. Although all 
European countries demonstrate a profound Christian influence, no 
juridical system is comparable to another. One finds in Europe a 
mixture of state-church systems (for example, the systems of 
England, Denmark, Greece, Sweden, and Finland); systems of 
separation (such as the systems of Holland, Ireland, and France); and 
systems using formulas that combine basic separation and 
cooperation (such as the systems of Germany, Belgium, Austria, 
Spain, Italy, and Portugal). However, profound influences are 
diverse, and not always in the way that one would think. For 
example, religious influence is stronger in Ireland (in spite of its 
system of separation) than in Sweden (which maintains a state-
church system).1 The church-state connections are weaker in 
Catholic Europe than in Protestant or Orthodox Europe.2 
From a legal perspective—especially in terms of sources of law—
the fundamental principles that govern the relations between 
political power and religions are widely dispersed. They can be found 
in national constitutions, in European texts (European Convention 
 
 1. See JACQUES ROBERT, LA LIBERTÉ RELIGIEUSE ET LE RÉGIME DES CULTES 109 
(1977). 
 2. See id. 
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on Human Rights3), in the laws of each state, in each country’s 
historically observed practices, in concordats formed with the Roman 
Catholic Church, in international law, in various conventions passed 
with particular religious confessions (for example, in Spain or Italy), 
and in informal accords. Also, note that the varied nature of the 
state’s recognition of denominations implicitly permits a distinction 
between the more represented denominations (and presumably the 
better established or more serious denominations) and certain 
others. Unfortunately, this distinction is often left to the arbitrary 
discretion of political decision makers. 
Certain groups also form under the auspices of a statute of public 
or private law; others form under common law or sui generis—the 
formulas vary. Radical separation is rare but is more frequent when it 
finds itself blended with the idea of a positive neutrality, or unofficial 
cooperation. 
The cultural role of churches is marked, especially in education, 
with every modality of adaptation imaginable. Further, financing of 
churches by the government is rarely direct; it is usually masked by 
the cover of secret payments, public or discrete subsidies, tax 
exemptions, or payment through the maintenance of historic 
monuments. Secularization itself remains limited. In Holland, for 
example, the distinctive secularization of Dutch society does not 
keep a great number of social institutions or political parties from 
being organized on a religious basis. 
These varied religious forms are not, in and of themselves, 
incompatible with the recognition of general religious tolerance. For 
a state to choose a privileged church or religion does not necessarily 
signify that others are disadvantaged, much less persecuted. It has 
simply become evident to France that a regime of total separation—
by no means hostile to, but rather largely tolerant of religion—was 
the approach that conformed most with a modern democratic state. 
III. FRENCH SECULARITY 
The substance of the notion of secularity is found entirely within 
two articles of the French Law of 1905:   
 
 3. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Apr. 11, 1950, art. 10-1, Europ. T.S. No. 5. 
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Article 1: The Republic ensures the liberty of conscience. It 
guarantees the free exercise of religion, under restrictions prescribed 
by the interest in public order. 
 
Article 2: The Republic does not recognize, remunerate, or 
subsidize any religious denomination.4 
IV. THE NEUTRALITY OF THE STATE 
The fact that the French Republic no longer recognizes any 
religion does not signify that the state fails to appreciate the existence 
of religions, churches, or religious movements. This fact simply 
means that the state has definitively abandoned the system of 
“recognized religions.” The state wished to erase all distinction 
between the old recognized religions—the Catholic Church, the two 
principal Protestant churches, Judaism—and the others. By removing 
the distinction of recognized religions, the state put all religions on 
the same level politically. 
This policy of nonrecognition should not be understood to 
signify that the state does not wish to maintain good relations with 
religious groups. Nonrecognition is not an attitude of hostility or of 
suspicion. It simply implies that the existence of religion, contrary to 
concordative solutions, ceases to be a public affair. The inescapable 
consequence of this is that the state can no longer finance or 
subsidize a religion. 
V. SEPARATION 
At first, the implications of removing public funding for religious 
public services were notable: the disappearance of the Ministry of the 
Religious Budget and an end to favored treatment for religious 
ministers, particularly the naming of ecclesiastical dignitaries. Indeed, 
once a church fails to accomplish a mission of public service, a 
“public” religious organization ceases to exist and, therefore, the 
church or organization no longer has a right to be viewed as 
“institutional” by public authorities. The corollary of this end to 
public service by organized religions is that all churches are left with 
 
          4.   See Law of Dec. 9, 1905, arts. 1–2, J.O., Dec. 11, 1905, p. 7205 [hereinafter Law 
of 1905]. 
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total liberty to organize themselves and to interpret their internal 
rules. 
The jurisprudence of French tribunals—judicial and 
administrative—bears witness to their wisdom in not meddling in 
religious rules, in a law which is not their own.5 The courts do not 
take jurisdiction unless a threat to public order exists. 
VI. FINANCIAL “COEXISTENCE” 
From a financial point of view, the law of separation only 
prohibits the inscription of credits intended to subsidize, 
permanently and regularly, service by churches. One can therefore 
conclude that the Law of 1905 allows for: 
• The possibility of state subsidies for activities that have a 
general character despite taking place in a religious setting: 
charities, hospitals, nurseries, general charitable activities, etc. 
• Direct administration by public collectives of certain religious 
services (religious instruction in public establishments such as 
high schools, junior high schools, hospitals, asylums, prisons, 
etc.) if the organization is deemed indispensable to insure for 
everyone the free exercise of religion. 
• The payment of religious ministers when they render services 
to the general public (national religious ceremonies, media 
events, etc.). 
On the other hand, tribunals exercise a certain oversight function 
over “disguised subsidies”; even so, their jurisprudence often appears 
indulgent.6 The institutional separation of the churches from the 
state, which was sought in 1905, implies that the state does not 
disadvantage religions but ceases to recognize, to pay, and to 
subsidize them; such a separation comes with the obligation to be 
“religiously neutral.” 
 
 5. See Conseil d’État, Feb. 8, 1908, Abbé Deliard, Rec. P. 128; C. Cass., Feb. 6, 1912, 
S. Jur. I, 1912, 137; Conseil d’État, Feb. 16, 1923, Presbyterian Association of the Reformed 
Church, Rec. P. 115; Conseil d’État, Jan. 25, 1943, Reformed Church of Marseille, Rec. P. 
116; T.G.I., Paris, Oct. 29, 1976, SOVEVOCA and the Consistorial Israelite Assembly of Paris, 
JCP 1977, No. 18664 (note by Jean Carbonnier); Cass. 1e civ., Oct. 17, 1978, Abbe Coache 
v. Abbe Bellgo, D. 1979, at 120, 1979 Bull. Civ. I, No. 308. 
 6. See Conseil d’État, Nov. 28, 1913, Commune de Chambon, Rec. P. 774; Conseil 
d’État, May 16, 1919, Commune de Montjoie, Rec. P. 429. 
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VII. NEGATIVITY AND POSITIVITY 
This religious neutrality is, however, simultaneously negative and 
positive.7 It is negative because the state that allows for all the diverse 
manifestations of thought, that does not reject any ideology but 
welcomes them all, would not know how to choose one it would 
officially champion and promote. Of course, the state might have 
secret preferences, but it must keep from publicizing these 
preferences, from supporting or giving priority to those who share 
these preferences, and from attempting to impose these preferences 
on other groups through pressure. 
Two texts are worth invoking here: 
• Article 10 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen, which establishes that no one should be harassed about 
his or her opinions, including religious opinions.8 
• Article 2 of the Constitution of 4 October 1958 under the 
terms of which France is a “secular” state that “assures equality 
before the law for all citizens without distinction based on origin, 
race or religion.”9 
These two texts create a perfect connection between the notion 
of negative neutrality that presupposes the discretion of the state and 
that of positive neutrality that implies the engagement of the state to 
guarantee to each person in his or her daily experience the free 
exercise of his or her religion. This puts at the disposition of all, if 
the situation requires, the means to observe their religions’ rules. 
From this exigency, several statutes have evolved in France, including 
the Statute of Chaplaincies, the regulation of the animal- 
slaughtering methods and slaughterhouse conditions, the 
recognition of conscientious objectors, and the de facto 
rearrangement of certain school schedules.10 
 
 7. See Jean Rivero, La notion juridique de laïcité, D. 1949 CHRONIQUE 137; J.B. 
Trotabas, La notion de laïcité dans le droit de l’Eglise catholique et de l’Etat républicain, Paris 
L.G.D.J. 19670, at 223; J. Coulombel, Le droit privé francais devant le fait religieux depuis la 
separation de l’Eglise et de l’Etat, 1956 REVUE TRIM. DE DROIT CIVIL 7. 
 8. See Jacques Robert & Henri Oberdorff, Libertés fondamentales et Droits de l’homme, 
in TEXTES FRANCAIS ET INTERNATIONAUX (5th ed. 2002). 
 9. See id. 
 10. See JACQUES ROBERT & JEAN DUFFAR, DROITS DE L’HOMME ET LIBERTÉS 
FONDAMENTALES 298 (7th ed. 1999). 
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Thus, it is formally demonstrated that the “neutrality”—positive 
or negative—of the state cannot proceed without respect for liberty 
of conscience. 
VIII. LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE 
The nonreligious nature of the state places citizens on equal 
moral footing with respect to the state. This equality is rigorous 
because the state does not claim to profess any particular faith in the 
name of the nation. Therefore, no room exists for categorization of 
second-class citizens on the basis of religious convictions. The will of 
the state to avoid knowledge of citizens’ spirituality is, from this fact, 
a guarantee of liberty for the diverse religious confessions.11 
The “indifferent” state has no need to ask itself what counts as a 
religion because, in principle, it neither professes nor knows one. 
The principle of religious liberty precludes the operation of any type 
of distinction between religions, whether the religion is practiced by 
a “cult”12 or by a traditional church. One finds in this preclusion the 
principal applications of religious freedom that are the principles of 
equality and nondiscrimination between religions. Further, the 
principle of nondiscrimination itself induces a positive attitude on the 
part of the state; the state must protect minority religions in the very 
name of religious freedom. The affirmation that the state guarantees 
liberty of conscience signifies not only that the state is itself obligated 
to respect this liberty, but also that it will take responsibility for 
preventing violations of this liberty by its citizens and others.13 
The principle of liberty of conscience is also under the sanction 
of French penal law. The Law of 1905 created the crime of harming 
liberty of conscience. Article 31 of this law provides for the 
 
 11. See L. De Naurois, Aux confins du droit prive et du droit public, 1962 REVUE TRIM. 
DE DROIT CIVIL 242. 
 12. Editor’s note: Professor Robert employs the French term secte here. The translation 
of the French word secte into English is problematic because in French, secte has almost as 
many negative connotations as does our English word “cult.” However, despite these negative 
connotations the word secte remains theoretically slightly neutral. Thus, there is a distinction in 
French between a secte and a secte dangereuse. The most accurate way to translate secte would 
probably be “rather unknown and probably dangerous religious movement.” For practical 
reasons, we have chosen to translate most instances of secte as “cult.” Where the author 
employs the term secte as a neutral term to refer to a new religious movement, it has been 
translated as “sect.” Also note that the French word culte has no negative connotation at all, 
and is best translated simply as “religion.” 
 13. See Naurois, supra note 11. 
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punishment of those who utilize violent acts or threats against an 
individual (creating either fear of job loss or causing injury to the 
individual’s person, family, or wealth) to force that individual to 
participate, or to refrain from participating, in a religion.14 
In a larger context, respect for freedom of conscience is affirmed 
by the recognition of the illicit character of all attitudes that show an 
attempt to discriminate on the basis of expressed or supposed beliefs 
and to cause one to fear, in any manner, because of these religiously 
held opinions.15 This interdiction of all attitudes that are hostile to 
any religion is imposed on all: on individuals, on churches, and on 
the state itself. 
Neutral and secular, the state would not be able to practice the 
slightest discrimination with regard to any religious movement nor 
favor any particular propaganda that could harm a religion, insofar as 
each movement respects the restrictions prescribed by the state 
according to its interest in public order. 
IX. PUBLIC ORDER AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
French texts have often—and perhaps abusively—linked public 
order and religious liberty. One remembers the ambiguous and 
restrictive formulation of Article 10 of the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man: “No one shall be harassed on account of his or her opinions, 
including religious views, provided their manifestation does not 
disturb the public order established by law.”16 One must also 
remember that even though the first French Constitution17 considers 
the liberty conferred upon all people to exercise their religious beliefs 
to be a “natural and civil right,” its first article, consecrated to 
“fundamental provisions guaranteed by the Constitution,” defines the 
limits of that liberty. That article specifies that liberty only consists of 
the power to act in a manner that does not endanger public safety or 
 
 14. See Law of 1905, supra note 4, art. 31. 
 15. See Conseil d’État, July 9, 1943, Ferrand C.D. 1944, at 150 (Corbinnier note); 
Conseil d’État, April 28, 1938, Demoiselle Weiss R.D.P. 1938, at 553; Conseil d’État, Dec. 8, 
1948, Demoiselle Pasteau R.D.P. 1949, at 73; C. Cass. July 19, 1898, D.P. I 424; Trib. civ. 
Seine, Mar. 3, 1933, S. Jur. II 1934, 2, 67; Trib. civ. Seine June 18, 1945, Gaz. Pal. 1945, 2, 
38; CA Amiens, March 3, 1975, Guy Ferchault v. Marcell Bascot, épouse Ferchault, D.1975, 
at 706 (note by Géraldy). See also for all these points: Jacques Robert, La liberté religieuse et le 
régime des cultes, in PUF COLLECTION SUP 109 (1977). 
 16. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN, art. 10 (Fr.) 
(approved by the National Assembly of France on Aug. 26, 1789). 
 17. LA CONSTITUTION (1791). 
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individual rights. Thus the law, and the law alone, is always authorized 
to penalize the authors of those acts that would prove harmful to 
society because of their threat to public safety or their erosion of 
others’ rights. 
X. THE ISLAMIC SCARF 
Reference to public order is found in the Law of 1905,18 and it  
recently reappeared in an opinion from the Conseil d’Etat dated 
November 27, 1989.19 That opinion discussed whether the wearing 
of religious badges or religious identifiers in French public schools is 
compatible with the principle of secularism in the public service of 
education. 
Following a review of the internal and international texts upon 
which this principle is founded, the Conseil d’Etat clearly indicated 
that allowing students to wear such identifiers is merely an aspect of 
the general principle of secularism and neutrality of the state. The 
Conseil d’Etat found that these principles require the state to respect 
the students’ liberty of conscience, meaning that the state should 
abolish all discrimination by public schools based on their students’ 
religious convictions or beliefs. 
The religious freedom thus recognized for these students secures 
for them the right to express and to manifest their religious beliefs 
within scholarly establishments, in the spirit of pluralism and respect 
for the rights of others. However, this recognition does not grant 
students free rein to flaunt symbols of religious adherence that by 
their nature, by the conditions under which they would be worn 
individually or collectively, or by their ostentatious or aggressive 
character would constitute an act of pressure, provocation, 
proselytism, or propaganda. Such flaunting would bring harm to the 
dignity and liberty of the students and other members of the 
educational community and would compromise the students’ 
security and well-being, disturbing the teaching process and the 
teachers themselves. In the end, such flaunting would disturb the 
 
 18. See Law of 1905, supra note 4, art. 1. 
 19. Opinion from the Conseil d’Etat dated November 27, 1989. The Conseil d’Etat has 
two roles. The first is as a judicial body that resolves litigation between individuals and the 
state. The second is as an advising body that provides non-binding opinions and advice to the 
executive branch. Often when a difficult legal question arises for the French government, the 
government turns to the Conseil d’Etat as a first step in finding a solution. 
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public order and the normal functioning of the public teaching 
establishment.20 
Since this opinion, the Conseil d’Etat has been obliged to clarify 
its position. The council overturned a school’s internal regulation 
stipulating that “wearing any distinctive sign, clothing or otherwise, 
of a religious, political or philosophical order is strictly forbidden.”21 
Such a regulation, by the generality of its terms, effectively created a 
general and absolute prohibition that completely ignored the 
students’ recognized freedom of expression in the context of the 
principles of neutrality and secularism in public education. Given this 
result, the decisions to exclude several young girls from junior high 
on the sole basis of this general prohibition must be overturned. 
Indeed, for those decisions to have been correctly made, the schools 
would have needed to establish that, under the circumstances, the 
wearing of this type of Islamic scarf constituted by its very nature “an 
act of pressure, provocation, proselytism or propaganda, or [that 
disturbs] the public order and the normal functioning of the 
teaching process.”22 
At first, the issue of the Islamic scarf only seemed to bother the 
conscience of other students. In the end, however, it might also 
disturb the conscience of the instructors. Certain instructors had 
already indicated that they were not far from refusing to teach 
students whose clothing negated, for the teachers, the very values 
that a republican school should represent. But such an attitude was 
intolerable. The principle of secularism requires the total absence of 
discrimination between students on the basis of their religion. The 
faculty must not be authorized to make any kind of distinction 
between students based on religious attire. 
In summary, the state—secular, neutral, respectful of all opinions 
and beliefs, guarantor of freedom of religion and worship, and 
propagandist for no faith or ideology—cannot oppose religious 
movements that prosper in its territory using as its reason only the 
policy of protecting the public order. Further, all religious 
movements that respect the public order must have their religious 
practices protected equally. If not, history has given a privileged 
 
 20. See Avis, No. 34893, Assemblée générale plénière, 1990 A.J.D.A. 3945 (note by 
P.P.C.); R.F.D.A., 1990, at 1–9 (note by Jean Rivero). 
 21. See Conseil d’État, Nov. 2, 1992, Kherovara & Kachour, N. Balo and Mme. Kizic. 
 22. Conseil d’État, Nov. 2, 1992, Les Petites Affiches, May 24, 1993, No. 62 (see note 
by Gilles Lebreton, Port de signes religieux et laicité de l’enseignement public). 
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position to certain religions, favored only because they have been 
around longer and have been accepted with less reticence because 
society is more accustomed to having them in France. 
Many today point out that the landscape has completely 
transformed into an environment of religious liberty confronted with 
a proliferation of movements whose dynamism and originality are 
simultaneously fascinating and worrisome. Identifying and 
characterizing these movements is difficult. Moreover, faithful 
members of much older religions are becoming more numerous in 
France, and they are also pressing for a de facto “official” status, 
which is recognized for others.23 
XI. THE SECTARIAN PHENOMENON 
French society is unfamiliar with the proliferation of religious 
denominations and the multiplicity of churches that are familiar to 
Anglo-Saxon societies. For us, the notion of a secte has a pejorative 
connotation that some great democracies of our day reject.24 In 
France, a juridical theory of secte has been painstakingly elaborated 
after many years and through a constant flow of often passionate 
debates. This theory distinguishes sectes from religions; thus, the 
theory does not provide sectes with the same protection provided to 
religions by international texts. 
Therefore, it is necessary to define the determinative criteria of a 
secte with precision. Many criteria have been successively advanced by 
modern sociology and, taken together, will identify a secte. However, 
these criteria, heretofore advanced by sociology, have been 
somewhat abandoned in our day. 
 
 23. Even though France is a secular state that does not officially recognize any religion, 
in effect there remains a de facto regime of “recognized religions” consisting of the Catholic 
Church, the Reformed Church, the Lutheran Church, and the Jewish religion. These are the 
only churches to maintain official relations with the state. Other religions exist, of course, but 
they are simply “tolerated” and do not enjoy “official status.” Their lack of status is 
undoubtedly because they do not have a representative structure that is capable of ready 
dialogue with the state. 
 24. See supra note 12. 
ROB-FIN 5/31/2003  1:26 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Year 
648 
XII. ESTABLISHING CRITERIA 
A. Number of Adherents 
The first criterion of a secte is that it has a small number of 
adherents. One here could easily bring up the contradiction that 
arises by retaining such a criterion in an era where respect of 
minorities is proclaimed as a national and international moral 
principle. However, by simply stepping inside the very notion of 
religion, one cannot help but notice that it is the religions (whose 
character as a religion is not or is no longer contested) that choose, 
by theological exigence, to be religions for those who profess 
membership, rather than simply religions for the masses. Based 
simply on the facts, one must expect many setbacks when attempting 
to use quantitative criteria. A community, numerically weak in a 
country, is often no more than a particular branch of a much larger 
group dispersed among different countries. 
B. Eccentricity 
A second criterion of a secte is eccentricity. If a secte must be 
defined with reference to rationality, one cannot differentiate 
between religion and secte because the nature of a religious faith is, at 
least in certain respects, irrational and mystic. 
C. Newness 
Another criterion of a secte is newness. Newness is probably the 
criterion that has the greatest impact. This is true because the age of 
a religious movement is easy to verify, but also perhaps because time 
is a familiar dimension in the law. A secte is essentially a “newly-
born” religion.25 The phenomena so frequently analyzed in religious 
studies, such as dissidence, schism, heresy, and reform, attest to the 
possibility of newly-formed confessions, created in a single moment. 
To forbid all creativity in theological research is, above all, to deny 
 
 25. This idea of newness is determined with respect to the religion’s emergence in 
France. This is the only criterion that concerns French law, which does not consider itself 
competent to judge or regulate all the new religious movements that begin in other countries. 
French authorities only begin tracking a religious movement when it appears in France for the 
first time. 
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one of the most essential forms of liberty of conscience and to 
diminish the religious experience. 
D. External Origin 
Objection to newness is sometimes transposed from history into 
geography and becomes a type of objection to anything of external 
origin; but this is an inadmissible objection. In fact, it would be 
more valid against an established religion and, taken to its logical 
extreme, against Christianity as a whole. In law, this argument 
against anything of external origin is condemned by the principle of 
free communication, which today is inscribed in Article 10-1 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.26 This convention recognizes the right of 
every person to receive or to communicate ideas without regard to 
national borders.27 Thus, the notion of a secte is difficult to define.28 
XIII. THE NOTION OF RELIGION 
One could say that religion is defined by two elements: one 
objective and the other subjective. The objective element is given by 
the existence of a community. A community is more than a simple 
aggregation of individuals; it is a coherent group, a moral being. 
Religion is a collective phenomenon; it is not necessarily a mass 
phenomenon. There are churches that consider themselves national 
churches; others recognize their own minority status or micro-
minority status. French positive law has wisely refused to integrate 
confessional statistics into its standards. Article 19 of the Law of 
1905 is significant.29 It does not give the slightest consideration to 
the makeup of a particular sectarian organization, whether it has a 
greater or smaller number of adherents that profess to be members. 
The subjective element defining religion is faith or religious 
belief. Faith has its center in the individual conscience. Nevertheless, 
faith is not a solitary conscience, but a reciprocity of consciences that 
 
 26. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Apr. 11, 1950, art. 10-1, Europ. T.S. No. 5. 
 27. See id. 
 28. Incidentally, is it not the same with religion? Do we know today with exactness what 
really constitutes a religion? See Jacques Robert, Accepter la foi, LE MONDE DES DÉBATS, Feb 
1994, at 9; see also Robert & Duffar, supra note 9, at 298. 
 29. See Law of 1905, supra note 4, art. 19. 
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engenders religion. Because of this fact, these two elements—
community and faith—are mutually dependent. One must have faith 
to give meaning to a group, but it requires a group, restrained as it 
might be, to bring faith to an expression which law cannot 
accomplish. 
It is from a common faith, a spiritual communion, or a 
community of beliefs that a group draws its coherence. However, 
religious belief is equally difficult to define. One may be tempted to 
define religious belief with reference to the behaviors that manifest 
it: practices, observances, rights, liturgies, and sacraments. These 
behaviors often have an originality that signals the presence of a 
religion. Even so, this argument is not necessarily decisive. After all,  
municipalities were the first to organize civil baptism, and the Cour 
d’assises has its own ritual. Gestures alone are empty forms; only the 
belief that animates them can give them a religious significance. 
One must return then to what is at the heart of the question: the 
object of the belief. Not every conviction is a faith. Neither a political 
party nor a school of philosophy constitutes a religion. The essence of 
religion is the call to a divinity, or at least to a supernatural power, 
transcendence, the absolute, or the sacred. The individual formulas vary. 
Nevertheless, not all cases are equally litigious. There can exist, 
for example, an indecisive zone between the invocation of the 
supernatural, which is religion, and metaphysical speculation, which 
is no more than philosophy. Belief in a god, however, gives the 
general impression of a religion without requiring some sort of 
external representation of that god. 
XIV. EVERYONE MUST RESPECT THE LAW 
In the final analysis, no religious movement is above the law. 
Each church, association, or secte is responsible for its acts. French 
law will not leave unpunished the condemnable actions of all those 
who come to illegitimately proselytize and who thus contravene—
voluntarily or not—the law’s mandates. By contravening the law, 
these people situate themselves in the outer margins of society. 
Penal infractions are numerous and strictly defined: fraud, abuse 
of trust, violence and assault, illegal confinement, lack of assistance 
to a person in danger, extreme breaches of fundamental social mores, 
organizing prostitution, illegal practice of medicine, abduction and 
brainwashing of a minor, etc. 
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Aside from criminal prosecution, the administration could either 
nullify an organization that was founded for an illicit purpose, that 
acts with illicit objectives, or that acts contrary to the law or to 
fundamental social mores. The administration could also pronounce 
a dissolution of the organization based on the ordinance of October 
2, 1943, which allows the dissolution of groups and associations 
“having an activity contrary to the liberty of conscience and the 
liberty of worship.”30 The administration could also invoke the text, 
modified in 1972, of the Law of January 10, 1936, which deals with 
combat groups and private militia.31 
With regard to old as well as new religions, the state will not 
tolerate the slightest affront to order or law. 
XV. PREVENTIVE ACTION 
It is noteworthy that, in the area of private prevention, none are 
prohibited (especially not families) from warning their children or 
those close to them—those who are most vulnerable—against all 
temptations and social perils. Parents have always had complete 
latitude to protect their children from dangerous associations, 
perverse seductions, and harmful contagions. It remains true that the 
notion of public order can lead to different interpretations. 
XVI. AGAINST ALL “MORAL RELIGIOUS ORDERS” 
Today, public and social order is no longer confused with moral 
and religious order; the secular state, since 1905, respects and 
protects all religious denominations. However, it must not be 
forgotten that Judeo-Christian thought has forged the Western 
mentality and that we are more familiar with certain denominations 
than with others that may shock us by their exterior aspect, their 
esotericism, or their ostensible attachment to beliefs and rituals that 
are foreign to our culture. Cults are not the only groups that need be 
worried. The awakening of certain ancient religions and the 
expansion of their practice may also pose problems. From this point 
forward, a danger exists that discrimination will arise between old 
 
 30. Ordinance of Oct. 2, 1943, J.O., Aug. 10, 1944, p. 32. 
 31. See the Law of January 10, 1936, J.O., Jan. 12, 1936, p. 522, regarding militant 
groups and private militias. See also CODE PÈNAL arts. 431-13–431-20 (Fr.) (amended by 
Ordinance No. 2000-916 of Sept. 19, 2000, J.O., Sept. 22, 2000, p. 14877), noted in Robert 
& Oberdorff, supra note 7, at 676. 
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and new religions since all do not exercise the same influence on the 
national culture and all do not have the same place in our common 
heritage. 
If public law cannot ignore such “specific religious 
characteristics,” the recognition of a difference between religions will 
in no case lead to state sponsored discrimination between them. The 
protective equality of secularity must not be wiped out in the name 
of differentiation. 
XVII. WHAT ABOUT PUBLIC OPINION? 
Two major currents underlie public opinion. On the one hand, 
some—admitting that Max Weber’s classic analyses distinguishing 
churches from cults are completely outdated—believe that the 
evolution of science and faith has led to a sort of “deregularization” 
of all beliefs and to transfers and migrations heavy with 
amalgamations and derivatives. On the other hand, some continue to 
believe that to avoid abuses by certain misguided groups, it is better 
to put in place a systematic and nondiscriminatory general policy for 
all groups that appear to be cults. This goal may seem praiseworthy, 
but it brings us back to the problem of definitions that is so difficult 
to resolve. 
Even so, a permanent tension currently exists between the 
temptation of ideological denunciation and the legal neutrality of the 
state. 
XVIII. THE FRENCH LEGISLATIVE APPROACH 
The fluctuations and frequent changes in the French legislative 
approach with regard to cults perfectly reflect the ambiguity of this 
redoubtable dilemma. Early in the process, numerous initiatives were 
launched that attempted to block new cults, or at least to keep them 
under surveillance to prevent them from branching further. In 
November 1998, the Prime Minister replaced the “l’Observatoire 
international des sects”, created in 1996 to analyze the development 
of cults (International Cult Surveillance Center), with a “Mission 
interministérielle de lutte contre les sectes” (“MILS”) (Inter-
Ministerial Mission for the Fight Against Cults). The MILS was 
established with a goal of creating a more operational tool to analyze 
cults and to improve the methods of fighting against them. 
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Similarly, one of the laws of December 18, 1998, regarding 
scholastic obligations, allowed the state to verify through 
accreditation officers the substance of the instruction provided in the 
setting of “private structures.” In June 1999, a parliamentary 
investigative commission presided over by Jacques Guyard submitted 
a report on “cults and money” that offered thirty propositions for 
countering the influence of cults in all domains where cults—an 
arbitrary and strongly-contested list of cults had earlier been 
prepared—were at work. And finally, in December 1999, the Senate 
Commission on Laws adopted a proposition by Nicolas About aimed 
at dissolving “malicious groups.” 
All these initiatives clearly show that the phenomenon of cults is 
considered suspect and that plans are being made to protect society 
from these cults. 
The clear excess of certain positions against cults and the 
impossibility—legal as well as political—of implementing the 
proposed anticult methods currently show that authorities are 
somewhat powerless to deal with this problem. Some groups are 
lobbying for an approach that would classify repeat criminal 
offenders and all groups that constitute “a threat to public order or a 
great danger to mankind”32 within the statutory category of “combat 
groups and armed militias.” This statutory category was created by 
the law of January 10, 1936. 
The Ministry of the Interior carefully clarified in a flyer dated 
December 20, 1999, that “the designation as part of the cult 
movement that is given to a group by the various parliamentary 
reports should not be considered enough alone to impute any kind 
of threat to public order by that group.”33 It thus appears that the 
very idea of general legislation applicable to all cults has been 
definitively pushed aside. However, it was not ruled out that a fight 
against cults should begin based on existing legislation and the 
related case law concerning tax-related and scholastic obligations. 
Another report, officially submitted on February 7, 2000, by the 
president of the MILS in Matignon, revived the idea of an emphasis 
on repressive legislation against cults. The report seemed to reserve 
these new methods for only those cults considered dangerous—
 
 32. See supra note 31. 
 33. See supra note 31. 
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groups considered to be totalitarian organizations that employ 
manipulative methods. 
However, in May 2001, the senate adopted a “law tending to 
reinforce the prevention and repression of groups of a cultic 
nature.”34 This text was the result of a long negotiation between the 
two assemblies, the government, and the MILS. The first version of 
the text, adopted by the senate at its first reading on December 16, 
1999, had been largely modified on June 22, 2000, when it went 
before l’Assemblée Nationale. The deputies had introduced into the 
text, at the request of Madame Catherine Picard, the creation of a 
specific crime of “mental manipulation.” This change had evoked 
numerous hostile reactions and Madame Elisabeth Guigou, then 
Keeper of the Seals, requested further study on this point in 
association with the Commission nationale consultative des droits de 
l’homme (“CNCDH”), (National Consulting Commission on the 
Rights of Man). Because this commission esteemed the creation of 
such a crime inadvisable, the text was modified to only punish the 
crime of fraudulent abuse of ignorance or weakness. Thus the text, 
which is still in force today, only accounts for the case where a 
person is psychologically or physically subject to another as a result 
of serious or repeated pressure or techniques calculated to alter that 
person’s judgment or to lead that minor or that person to an act or 
omission that is seriously detrimental to that person. 
Representatives of large religions are asking themselves today 
who will judge the detrimental character of that act or omission. Of 
necessity, it will be the judge. And the judgment will be subject to 
recent trends, to variations over time, and to external pressures. Even 
judges are currently asking themselves just how far one can go in 
applying such a text. 
It is also noteworthy that this text envisions the possibility of 
judicial dissolution of cultic groups when a group has repeatedly 
engaged in such prohibited conduct as attempted murder, torture, 
rape and sexual aggression, or the illegal practice of medicine or 
pharmacy. What else is there, then, for the fight against cults, besides 
an arsenal of repressive laws? The state would be better off 
developing preventive methods and perhaps spending more time 
considering the true roots of the evil. 
 
 34. This text is not the current law but was only part of the draft before its presentation 
to the National Assembly. 
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The National Assembly unanimously approved a law on June 12, 
2001, that essentially adopts two provisions that were discussed at 
length. One has, in a way, dressed up the old notion—dating back to 
the Napoleonic Code—of fraudulent abuse of a state of ignorance or 
weakness. This language signifies that although any church leader, 
guru, or mage is free to deliver any message she wishes to deliver, 
she will still be subject to the law if she imperils the physical, moral, 
or material security of those who decide to follow her or if she 
derives a profit from her followers. Moreover, this text gives 
associations that attempt to fight cults the right to file a civil action 
against them. Certain organizations, associations, or groups who 
energetically combat the new religious movements could thus 
possibly step into the shoes of abused or victimized former adepts to 
seek convictions and reparations. This right promises considerable 
conflict with pro-secte groups formed by these movements who 
openly express desires to be present in the legal domain. 
Thus, it remains that by extending criminal liability to new 
categories of crimes, by developing criminal liability for legal entities, 
and by creating the possibility of dissolution if the implicated legal 
entity or its leaders were convicted of any one of the infractions listed 
in the new text, the law of June 12, 2001, constitutes a new 
instrument in the struggle against cults. Additionally, it should be 
conceded that each analysis will have to be subject to very delicate 
handling and will require a necessarily subjective application. 
How does one define—as noted above—and, even more 
important, how does one manage to circumscribe this complex and 
fluid notion of “a subjective state”? As for the necessity that the act 
or omission be seriously detrimental, this requirement leads one to 
an analysis in which it is difficult to remain objective. After all, 
certain rules or practices, respected through the ages by well-known 
religious congregations, such as fasting, poverty, chastity, obedience, 
and becoming part of a monastic order, could one day also be 
considered seriously detrimental to the individual. And, it does not 
make good legal sense to label a group as a “cult” solely by the 
nature of the crime that one suspects it will one day commit. 
XIX. FRENCH MUSLIMS 
The problem of Islam in France is evidently completely different 
from the problem of cults. The questions it poses, however, are 
nonetheless delicate. Today, Islam is numerically the second largest 
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religion in France. However, given this fact, Islam does not occupy 
as prominent a place in French social life as one might expect. 
That the presence of so many Muslims in France is a recent 
phenomenon explains why there are comparatively few Islamic 
churches in France. Indeed, such an underrepresentation would 
seem all the more clear if the French system of jurisprudence was 
somehow linked to religious symbols and sounds; the ringing of 
church bells, Presbyterian attributions, and processions far 
outnumber such sights as minarets and such sounds as the muezzin’s 
call to prayer. 
One thus witnesses a great discrepancy between law and reality. 
As has been demonstrated, the legal equality between religions is 
total and may be considered a constitutional principle drawn from 
secularism. However, the Law of 1905 actually only recognizes 
churches, or Christian institutions, and it is terribly complex and 
difficult to make Islamic communities fit the church mold. 
Moreover, the Law of 1905 was limited to the management of then-
existing issues, namely, the allocation of goods formerly belonging to 
public religious establishments between the various new religious 
associations. The law did not look to the future and did not foresee 
the possibility that new religious groups, absent from France in 
1905, would later entrench themselves in France. For Islam, 
therefore, France is neither a land of heritage nor of sufficient 
infrastructure. It was in this context that the imams came to be. To 
make its voice heard in the future, Islam needs to have access to 
religious broadcasting and quality radio stations to present a positive 
image of itself and its rich diversities. 
Where liberty is concerned, all religions are, of course, on an 
equal plane. Some, however, are more equal than others because 
they benefit from available legal advantages. These are the old 
recognized religions. These groups have solid structures that are 
accustomed to interfacing with the state. Additionally, as discussed 
above, the issues of property rights and allocation of goods are 
settled. In contrast, nothing similar has been contemplated to build 
up the religions that were not present in France in 1905. A number 
of solutions are being proposed today. Local collectives are being 
encouraged to construct mosques, to guarantee loans for their 
construction, or to consent to sell or lease land under favorable 
terms. But Islam today should be allowed to count on something 
beyond its own internal and foreign resources. 
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Will increased foreign influence be the price we pay for the 
absence of any public subsidies and for the weakness of indirect aid 
(training and education) for Muslims? It is urgent that we begin to 
carefully innovate these ideas without damaging the Law of 1905 
and the principle of secularism. It is absolutely necessary that the 
state have representative Muslim structures in place to negotiate with 
directly. 
The fluctuation of Paris Mosque, which seemed for a long time 
to be controlled by Algeria, led Pierre Joxe to create the Conseil de 
réflexion sur l’Islam de France (“CORIF”), (Council for Reflection 
on French Islam) in 1990. This council consisted of persons from 
different origins who were designated intuitu personae. The objective 
was twofold: first, to create a harmonizing organization that would 
advise public authorities on concrete problems regarding the exercise 
of the Muslim religion; and second, to encourage the creation of a 
representative structure for Islam in France. CORIF helped to 
advance many useful causes, such as the creation of religious plazas 
in cemeteries, the authorization of Muslim high priests, the 
construction of mosques, and the recognition of religious holidays. 
However, the absence of a truly representative Islamic structure is 
being felt more and more. Its absence grates on national and local 
public authorities who would like to permit Muslims to have a 
legitimate place in French society—to occupy the entire domain 
legally and permissibly in order to foster an integration respectful of 
beliefs and religious identities. The French government recently 
introduced some interesting initiatives to better structure French 
Islam and to replace CORIF with organizations more representative 
of the diversity of French Islam. 
XX. OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF CHURCHES 
All other major religions have a type of structure that can act as 
its official representative. The Catholic Church of France has a 
veritable government of shared responsibility: the Conference of 
Bishops of France meets each year and its president is the only 
person authorized to speak for all the French bishops. 
For its part, the Protestant Federation of France is an association 
under the Law of 1901 that groups several religious associations 
under the Law of 1905. Four principal churches make up this group: 
the Reformed Church of France, the Reformed Church of Alsace-
Lorraine, the Church of the Confession of Augsburg of Alsace-
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Lorraine, and the Lutheran Church. One must also add to this list 
the Independent Reformed Evangelic Church, the Federation of 
Baptist Churches, the Evangelical Mission, and others. Some 
confessions remain independent, however, like the Federation of 
Evangelical Churches, the Darbists, and the Adventists. 
As for the Christian Orthodox churches, they are grouped in an 
Orthodox Episcopal Confederation, but each church retains its 
autonomy (which is the same for the Armenians and the Coptics). 
All churches of Eastern tradition have collaborated to create a 
religious broadcast on public channels, entitled “Chrétiens 
orientaux” (Eastern Christians), in an attempt to strengthen the 
group and increase the religion’s influence. 
The Central Israelite Consistory of France and Algeria designates 
the Grand Rabbi of France but has differing tendencies (orthodox 
and liberal) in its core beliefs. Further, there are other Jewish 
movements that defend, on a secularist plane, the material and moral 
interests of the Jewish community. Most are grouped in the Conseil 
représentatif des organisations juives de France (“CRJF”) 
(Representative Council of Jewish Organizations of France) that 
sometimes comes into conflict in its relationship with the Consistory. 
Finally, there is the Fondation du judaisme français (French 
Foundation of Judaism) that follows principally the religion of the 
Shoah, allying itself to the World Jewish Congress. 
XXI. ADOPTING AN OFFICIAL MUSLIM REPRESENTATION 
The organizational structure of Islam in France is still up for 
debate. Evidence shows that a hierarchical structure such as that of 
the Catholic Church does not correspond to the Muslim religion—a 
religion that has never created a church and does not have a true 
clergy. And a corresponding structure must continue to be sought in 
other countries; after all, the French Catholic Church has been aptly 
criticized for being too papal and not Gallican enough. It would 
definitely be worthwhile today to begin planning for the 
establishment of a confederation grouping—for example, either 
ideologically or regionally—of the different Islamic religious 
associations. 
In November 1999, Jean Pierre Chevenement launched a broad-
based discussion on Islam that supported the notion of a national 
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representative body elected by regional representatives chosen by 
leaders of the mosques.35 But no agreement was reached on the 
possible presence of independent entities. Even so, the deliberations 
on Islam have led to progress. This success gives hope that there is 
light at the end of the long tunnel France has been traveling. 
However, every time the proponents of a system of Muslim 
representation seem to come to a basic agreement on a process—
however complicated—for the designation of future delegates to a 
central body, the date and details of implementation are again placed 
in doubt or postponed. 
XXII. THE POWER OF SIGNS 
All religions use symbols as landmarks and measure time with 
their own holidays and historical calendar. Thus, their history takes 
root in their tradition and defines a self-perpetuating destiny. 
Therefore, for the state to designate an official holiday or to 
determine a celebration date is never a neutral process. 
The French calendar is above all Christian, and even “Western-
Gregorian” in that it is not even followed by Eastern-Orthodox 
Christians or Armenians. With the exception of the French national 
holidays (January 1, May 1, July 14, November 11, and May 8), all 
other holidays are Christian (Ascension, Easter, Passover, Christmas) 
and even Roman Catholic (August 15). Other large religions—often 
forgotten (Judaism, Islam, etc.)—also have their own holidays, and 
these holidays are numerous. But the state does not officially 
recognize these holidays. France permits them, of course; 
occasionally we mark the date. And in some cases, these holidays are 
accommodated—Friday for the Muslims, Saturday for the Jews. We 
also accommodate dietary restrictions and arrange for Kosher food 
and its equivalents. But is this a worthy solution? Why are there such 
differences for the different religions? 
It is clear that we have not been able to truly get out of our rut—
so convenient to maintain—of recognized religions. These are the 
religions with which we are familiar and with whom we have been 
dealing for a long time. And what if, without our having noticed, 
these traditional religions were to be today completely discredited, 
rejected, and replaced? Were this to happen, non-traditional 
 
 35. This is currently not law, but only a proposal floated by Jean Pierre Chevenement. 
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spirituality would have senselessly given way to the dominant 
monotheistic traditions that have forged the Judeo-Christian or 
Islamic civilizations. Given that the great religious traditions and 
ideologies have been shown dramatically incapable of stopping the 
tragedies and massacres of history, how is it that the very word 
“religion” has not become suspect? 
Now, in an attempt to see a little more clearly into the morass of 
churches and dispersed religions, efforts are currently underway to 
try to categorize them—divide them into categories of good and 
bad. Lists have been prepared, and these lists denounce “dangerous 
cults,”36 based on uncertain criteria and unverified rumors. But 
among these sects and the major traditional religions that are 
supposed to be so steady and above suspicion, what is the status of 
all of the religious movements—new or old—that are not found in 
any list? These religions should enjoy the same official recognition as 
that of the traditional religions to which we are accustomed. If the 
state refuses to treat these religions equally simply because too few 
exist, this argument should also apply to all religious associations—
and isn’t it impossible to number the various associations that could 
exist? And yet many of them do benefit from advantages, aid, and 
special consideration. 
Further, as to the dangerous nature ascribed to and condemned 
in certain sects, some of our major religions are not totally innocent 
in this regard. Indeed, fanaticism has often reigned. Let us not 
reawaken the witch hunts and the Inquisition. And let us remember 
that, in spite of the recent decline in religious practice and the crisis 
involving the priesthood vocations, man has never had so great a 
need to reconnect to transcendental values.37 
Andre Malraux predicted long ago that our new century would 
be religious, or would not be at all. 
 
 
 36. The term in French is “sectes nocives.” 
 37. See JACQUES ROBERT, ENJEUX DU SIÈCLE: NOS LIBERTÉS [STAKES OF THE 
CENTURY: OUR LIBERTIES] 292 (2002). 
